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Abstract We investigate the profitability persistence of the investment recommendations from
analysts listed in four different star rankings, Institutional Investor magazine, StarMine’s BTop
Earnings Estimators^ and BTop Stock Pickers^, and The Wall Street Journal, and show the
predictive power of each evaluation methodology. We found that only Buy and Strong Buy
recommendations from the entire group of Star analysts outperform those of the Non-Stars in the
year after election, while Sell and Strong Sell recommendations performed as those of the Non-
Stars. We document that the highest average monthly abnormal return of holding a long-short
portfolio, 0.97 %, is obtained by following the recommendations of the group of star sell-side
analysts rated by StarMine’s BTop Earnings Estimators^ during the period from 2003 to 2014. Since
earnings are one of the main drivers of stock prices, the results obtained are in line with the notion
that focusing on superior earnings forecasts is one of the top requirements for successful stock picks.
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1 Introduction
This study analyzes whether investors can profit from the recommendations of ranked security
analysts. We examine whether an investor’s choice of a rating Bagency^ matters and how the
methodologies used by different star rankings are able to predict the investment value of the
recommendations. By investigating the precision of signals that the various methodologies use
in determining who the stars are, we distinguish between those star-selection methodologies
that capture a short-term stock-picking profitability and those methodologies that emphasize
more persistent skills of the analysts. As a result, this study documents that there are star-
selection methods that select analysts on the basis of more enduring analyst skills, and, thus,
their stars’ performance persists even after ranking announcement.
We compare the performance of the rankings by The Wall Street Journal and StarMine that
are explicitly based on the analysts’ past performance, which is objectively measured, with
those of the Institutional Investor rankings that are based on subjective survey assessments by
the analysts’ buy-side clients. The expected differences between objective and subjective
rankings in predicting stock recommendation performance depend on the persistence of the
outperformance of a small group of objectively ranked analysts. Such outperformance is
composed of both the stock-picking skill and luck. If outperformance is persistent, objective
methods will have an edge over subjective methods. However, if outperformance is primarily
due to luck and it is not persistent, then subjective rankings might work better if the buy-side
has insight on which analysts have better stock-picking skills amidst the noise. We have to
acknowledge that the different rankings could be directed to different clienteles rather than
focusing on stock-picking skills. In contrast, our study focuses on the persistence in economic
performance by the analysts, measured by portfolio returns.
Academic theory and banks do not reach the same conclusions about the value of security
analysts. The semi-strong form of market efficiency states that investors should not be able to earn
excess returns from trading on publicly available information, such as analysts’ recommendations.
However, banks and other firms spend large amounts of money on research departments and
security analysts, presumably because they and their clients believe that security analysis can
generate large abnormal returns. The importance of security analysis and analysts is also manifest
in the establishment, in 1998, and growth of StarMine, a competitor to TheWall Street Journal and
Institutional Investor’s rankings of analysts.1 In the following, we analyze the economic value of
security analysis – an activity performed by thousands of professionals in the finance industry with
the goal of improving their clients’ return performance.
The possibility that there could be profitable investment strategies based on the published
recommendations of security analysts is supported by multiple studies (Stickel 1995; Womack
1996; Barber et al. 2001; Boni and Womack 2006; Barber et al. 2010; Loh 2010) that show
that favorable (unfavorable) changes in individual analysts’ recommendations are accompa-
nied by positive (negative) returns at the time of their announcements. Hence, early work by
Womack (1996) documents a post-recommendation stock price drift for upgrades that lasts up
to one month and for downgrades that lasts up to six months.
Our perspective, however, differs from that of the above-mentioned studies. While the
studies cited focus on measuring the average price reaction to changes in individual analysts’
recommendations, we compare the profitability of recommendations issued by different groups
1 StarMine states in a sales message on their homepage: BStarMine is the world’s largest and most trusted source
of objective equity research performance ratings^ (StarMine 2015a).
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of analysts. However, we pursue a common goal of providing evidence as to whether,
assuming no transaction costs, profitable investment strategies could potentially be based on
the use of analysts’ recommendations. Specifically, we focus on differences between the
rankings of security analysts by Institutional Investor, The Wall Street Journal and StarMine
and on the profitability of their recommendations. Using this approach, we can determine
whether investors can earn positive abnormal returns on the investigated portfolio strategies
and whether differences in profitability are associated with the use of different star rankings.
We also compare star analysts’ recommendations with those of non-star analysts.
We use data from the Thomson Financials Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
Detail Recommendations File for the period from 2002 to 2013. We manually collected lists of
star analysts from Institutional Investormagazine (October 2003 –October 2013), TheWall Street
Journal (May 2003 –April 2013), and StarMine (October 2003 –August 2013). The lists of stars
are matched with I/B/E/S by analysts’ names and broker affiliations. Our final database contains
172,525 recommendations for 6443 companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
markets that were announced between January 2002 and October 2014. The hand-collected
database enables us to conduct original research by comparing the profitability of Institutional
Investor’s rankings of analysts with the rankings of StarMine and The Wall Street Journal.
Using this database, we measure and compare the investment values of portfolios formed
by recommendations of an entire group of star analysts (referred to as Stars2), a group of non-
star analysts (Non-Stars), and groups of stars as indicated by the different rankings (Institu-
tional Investormagazine, StarMine’s BTop Earnings Estimators^ and BTop Stock Pickers^, and
The Wall Street Journal). We divide our sample into two time frames, Year Before3 and Year
After, which correspond to the evaluation year and the one-year period after a particular star
ranking is announced until the next announcement date (and twelve-month period for the year
2013 which was the last year for rankings lists in our dataset), respectively.
In line with Emery and Li (2009) and Fang and Yasuda (2014), we sort analysts according
to their star/non-star status and use a well-established methodology of constructing dynamic
buy-and-hold portfolios with a holding period of one year to form a BLong^, BHold^, and
BShort^ portfolios for each group of analysts. The portfolio composition is formed according
to the recommendations issued by a particular group of analysts. A Long portfolio includes all
Buy and Strong Buy recommendations. Hold portfolio includes all Hold recommendations,
while a Short portfolio contains Sell and Strong Sell recommendations. Each time an analyst
reports that he or she has started covering a firm or changes his or her recommendation for a
firm, the firm is included or excluded from the portfolio at the close of the recommendation
announcement day (or at the close of the next trading day if the recommendation is issued after
the closing of trading or on a non-trading day). Any returns that investors might have earned
from prior knowledge of recommendations or from trading the recommended stocks during the
recommendation day are not included in the return calculations. Time series of daily returns
were used to estimate average risk-adjusted daily alphas for each portfolio. We then present the
results as monthly abnormal returns in percent by multiplying daily values by 21 trading days.
2 Throughout the paper, we capitalize and italicize the name of the group of Stars that consists of non-repeating
names of star analysts from all four different rankings. All other stars have lower-case spelling. Particularly,
lower-case spelling is used for either one particular group of star analysts or for the number-one ranked stars.
3 By using Year Before comparison, we compare the performance of analysts during the evaluation year in a
uniform way. We expect our result for the rankings to diverge due to the differences in election methods which
are used by different rankings.
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For our sample period, we find that only Strong Buy and Buy recommendations of star
analysts generated higher monthly average excess returns (alphas) (0.33 %) than those
recommendations by Non-Stars (0.18 %), while Hold, Sell and Strong Sell recommendations
performed insignificantly different from those of the Non-Stars.
Among the entire groups of stars, the best performance was observed for StarMine’s BTop
Earnings Estimators^, with a monthly excess return of 0.97 % followed by The Wall Street
Journal with 0.63 %, and StarMine’s BTop Stock Pickers^ stars with 0.54 %. The worst
performance was observed for Institutional Investor, with an excess return of 0.14 %. How-
ever, on a detailed level, Long portfolio of StarMine’s BTop Stock Pickers^ is the number one
portfolio, but its Short portfolio is the number three portfolio, which we interpret as suggesting
that StarMine’s BTop Stock Pickers^ might focus more on buy recommendations. Comparing
the Long portfolios of the top-ranked analysts, we find that the analyst ranked number one by
StarMine’s BTop Earnings Estimators^ had higher returns than the group of Non-Star analysts
and that the difference in returns was statistically significant.
Our results show that star analysts who are ranked in terms of the accuracy and timing of
their earnings forecasts, as in the methodology of StarMine’s BTop Earnings Estimators^, show
performance that is more persistent from the year of evaluation to the year after than the star
analysts who are ranked exclusively based on the previous performance of their recommen-
dations (stars listed by StarMine’s BTop Stock Picker^ and The Wall Street Journal). This
result reveals that focusing on earnings forecasts when ranking analysts provides higher
predictive power in selecting skilled analysts, while considering only the profitability of the
previous year’s recommendations leads to a large influence of luck. Previously, this result has
also been documented by Loh and Mian (2006). We interpret our results as indirect empirical
evidence in support for valuation models in the accounting and finance literature, underlining
the role of future earnings in forecasting future stock price movements as in Ohlson (1995).
Our contribution is the comparison of four different star rankings with a focus on the
profitability of investment recommendations using a recent dataset with a unique (hand-
collected) list of star analysts. Emery and Li (2009) use the information ratio, which is the t-
statistic of the intercept of the regression estimation, rather than a direct performance measure
of the profitability of recommendations, as is used here. Fang and Yasuda (2014) use a 1994–
2009 sample period and a 30-day holding period and find that recommendations issued by
Institutional Investor stars have significantly higher returns than those of all other analysts
(Non-Stars). In our study, we use a 2003–2014 sample period and a one-year time horizon for
recommendations issued by analysts and find that Institutional Investor has no statistically
significant predictive power. We document that other rankings using other measures in the
evaluation of analysts give better predictive power.
1.1 Ranking evaluation approaches
Analysts are rated as a Bstar^ based on their quality of previous reports, accuracy of forecasts
and returns generated for clients (Loh and Mian 2006). The four different rankings of sell-side
analysts in our study (see Table 1) can be divided into two main groups according to the
evaluation approach used: objective (StarMine and The Wall Street Journal) or subjective
(Institutional Investor). Two objective rankings are based exclusively on the investment value
of recommendations: BBest on the Street,^ issued by The Wall Street Journal, and BTop Stock
Pickers,^ issued by Thomson Reuters’ StarMine. A third objective ranking is BTop Earnings
Estimators,^ also issued by StarMine. It measures the accuracy and timing of each analyst’s
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earnings forecast. A subjective ranking that uses mixed evaluation methods is the survey-based
BAll-America Research Team^ issued by Institutional Investor magazine.
To select the members of the BAll-America Research Team^ ranking, Institutional Investor
(I/I) magazine sends a questionnaire to buy-side investment managers asking them to evaluate
various attributes of sell-side analysts. I/I magazine ranks three analysts in each industry and
also provides names of so-called Brunners-up^ who are promising and could possibly be
chosen in subsequent years. This list of stars is published in October and is usually supple-
mented by the 12 attributes in the survey that investors view as the most important to possess.
Attributes such as industry knowledge and integrity are listed among the most important, while
stock selection and earnings estimates are among the lowest-ranked attributes. Thus, the I/I
ranking is not primarily focused on stock-picking ability but rather covers a wide range of
attributes that are perceived to relate directly or indirectly to the ability of an analyst to make
profitable recommendations. These attributes could be of high value for some clientele, though
these qualitative attributes are not possible to measure by portfolio returns.
Previous research shows mixed results regarding the profitability of recommendations issued
by I/I stars. Measuring the investment value of recommendations during the period from 1994 to
2009, Fang and Yasuda (2014) show that I/I stars outperformed the group of Non-Stars, finding
Carhart 4-factor monthly alphas of 1.25 % for Long portfolios and −0.83 % monthly alphas for
Short portfolios of I/I stars compared with 1.09 % and −0.71 % for Long and Short portfolios for
Non-Stars, respectively. Using historical data from 1993 to 2005, Emery and Li (2009) investigate
I/I and WSJ rankings. The authors identify the determinants of star status and compare the two
rankings on the basis of earnings per share (EPS) accuracy and the industry-adjusted performance
of investment recommendations in the year before and one year after analysts become stars.
Emery and Li (2009) find, for the period from 1993 to 2005, that after becoming stars, star
analysts’ forecast accuracy of EPS does not differ from that of their non-star peers; the recom-
mendations of I/I stars are not statistically better than those of Non-Stars, while the recommen-
dations of WSJ stars are significantly worse. They conclude that both rankings are largely
Bpopularity contests^ and do not provide any significant investment value. In contrast, Leone
and Wu (2007) investigate the investment value of I/I stars’ recommendations issued from 1991
to 2000 and find that star analysts persistently issued profitable recommendations and that this
outperformance was not due to luck but to a superior ability to pick stocks.
Since 1993, TheWall Street Journal (WSJ) has published a list of BBest on the Street^ analysts
(before 2000, this ranking was named BAll-Star Analysts^), with five analysts ranked in each
industry during 2003–2011 and three analysts per industry in the years of 2012 and 2013. This
ranking is based on the score that an analyst obtained during the previous year, calculated as the
sum of one-day returns of recommendations (if an investor would invest one day before a
recommendation is announced and realize the return by the end of the recommendation day)
(Emery and Li 2009). Such an evaluation methodology focuses on short-term price forecasts and
favors analysts who issue recommendations on days when a price changes the most. At the same
time, it penalizes analysts who issue their recommendations before or after such days of sharp
price changes. Additionally, to benefit fully from such recommendations, investors should be able
to receive a recommendation one day before it is announced, which could be the case for a limited
number of investors with privileged access to analysts’ recommendations. According to Yaros
and Imielinski (2013), WSJ’s evaluation method is not able to avoid analysts who announce their
recommendations on the same day but after a significant price change has already occurred. All of
these considerations may generate significant randomness in the election of analysts into theWSJ
star ranking. As mentioned earlier, Emery and Li (2009) find that, after becoming stars, WSJ star
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analysts issue recommendations that underperform the group of Non-Stars. They interpret this
result as an effect of regression to the mean, as the short-term recommendation performance
includes a substantial random component.
Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP) and BTop Earnings Estimator^
(STM-TEE), which both include three analysts per industry, have been issued annually since
1998. They are both issued aroundOctober each year (except of those lists that were announced in
December 2009, May 2012, and August 2013). The STM-TSP ranking is based on the excess
returns of a non-leveraged portfolio built on all of the recommendations of each analyst. The
returns of each analyst are calculated using the long and short buy-and-hold portfolio method
relative to the market capitalization-weighted portfolio of all of the stocks in a given industry. The
portfolio is rebalanced each month and whenever the analyst changes rating, adds coverage or
drops coverage. The STM-TEE ranking measures the accuracy of each analyst’s earnings
forecasts and it is a measure of relative accuracy, since the analysts are compared against their
peers. The measure accounts for several factors: the analyst’s forecast error, the variance of the
analysts’ errors, the analyst’s error compared to other analysts, the timing of the estimates, and the
absolute value of the actual earnings of the firm. Themeasure is computed daily and aggregated to
provide scores on individual stocks, industries and the analyst overall (StarMine 2015b). Up to
2012, STM-TEE’s evaluation was based on earnings forecasts from the previous calendar-year.
However, from 2012, STM-TEE uses earnings from the immediate year before announcement of
the rankings lists. To summarize, the STM-TEE ranking differs from the STM-TSP and WSJ
rankings since it does not consider the investment value of analysts’ recommendations, thus
STM-TEE does not measure the abnormal returns on portfolios.
Although StarMine’s rankings appeared much later, they play an essential role in sell-side
research by providing an B…influential and an important reference in the industry^ (Kim and
Zapatero 2011). According to Beyer and Guttman (2011) and Ertimur et al. (2011), many Wall
Street firms use StarMine rankings when defining payments to their analysts. Recent work by
Kerl and Ohlert (2015) investigates the accuracy of earnings per share forecasts and target prices
of StarMine analysts compared with their non-star peers one year after the analysts became stars.
They find that analysts possess a persistent ability to issue accurate earnings forecasts, and after
becoming stars, they continue to issue more accurate earnings forecasts than non-star analysts.
Regarding the accuracy of target prices (TP), the authors cannot find any difference between the
two groups of analysts. The insignificant difference in TP forecasts could be due to the research
methodology: star analysts with BStock Picking Awards^ and BEarnings Estimate Awards^ are
grouped together to compare their accuracy with that ofNon-Starswithout splitting the sample of
StarMine’s stars into Top Stock Pickers and Top Earnings Estimators. However, according to the
StarMine methodology for determining the BStock Picking Awards^, analysts are not evaluated
on the basis of accuracy of EPS. Thus, it is possible that, even in the year before they receive an
award, this mixed group of stars does not outperform non-star peers in terms of the accuracy of
their forecasts. Furthermore, Kerl and Ohlert (2015) focus solely on the accuracy of EPS and TP
and the factors that influence such accuracy and do not compare the performance of recommen-
dations issued by star analysts with that of Non-Stars.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
We use four data sources. The Thomson Financials Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) Detail Recommendations File provides standardized stock recommendations for all
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of the various brokers’ scales by mapping all of the recommendations on a final scale from 1 to
5, where 1 corresponds to BStrong Buy ,^ 2 to BBuy ,^ 3 to BHold^, 4 to BSell^ and 5 to BStrong
Sell^. The Daily Stock File from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides
daily holding period stock returns, which include dividends as well as price and cash
adjustments. The Fama-French Factors – Daily Frequency database provides daily returns
for the factors of value-weighted market index, size, book-to-market and momentum. We
manually collected lists of star analysts from Institutional Investor magazine (October 2003 –
October 2013), The Wall Street Journal (May 2003 – April 2013), and StarMine (October
2003 – August 2013). The lists of stars are matched with I/B/E/S by analysts’ names and
broker affiliations and double-checked for any possible inconsistencies (typos in names,
analyst changes of broker in a given year, etc.). Our sample does not include analysts from
some brokerage houses, notably Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, as their recommenda-
tions are no longer available at I/B/E/S.
We use the following filters to the dataset. We keep only recommendations for stocks
classified as ordinary shares or American Depository Receipts (CRSP Share Codes 10, 11, 12,
30, 31, and 32). To avoid the influence of Bpenny stocks^ on our conclusions, we exclude
recommendations for stocks with a price that is less than one dollar. We also exclude the
recommendations from anonymous analysts or if the brokerage firm’s name or code is missing.
We consider only recommendation changes and ignore re-iterations since previous research
confirms that the changes carry more information than re-iterations (Boni and Womack 2006;
Barber et al. 2010). Our final recommendation sample consists of three levels: BLong^
(includes Strong Buy and Buy recommendations), BHold^, and BShort^ (includes Sell and
Strong Sell recommendations). Thus, if a particular analyst for a given company issues a Buy
recommendation soon after Strong Buy, the second recommendation, that is Buy, is considered
to be a re-iteration and thus it is omitted in our sample.
We use similar approach as Loh and Stulz (2011) for dealing with overall rating distribution
changes that occurred primarily due to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
Rule 2711 in 2002. In response to NASD Rule 2711, many brokers changed from a five-point
scale to a three-point scale for their recommendations (Kadan et al. 2009). By using the I/B/E/
S Stopped Recommendations File, we locate the dates when brokers stopped all previously
issued recommendations, and then check the following 60 days whether a broker resumed
coverage but on a three-point scale by having a new ratings distribution of either [1, 3, 5] or [2,
3, 4]. If a broker stopped the recommendations in order to re-initiate them on a three-point
scale, we arrange in sequence the recommendations before and after Rule 2711 as if there were
no BStop Recommendation^ signal. According to our methodology that is discussed in detail
in Section 3.1 (Methods), we focus only on recommendation changes between levels. Thus,
Buy and Strong Buy recommendations are considered to be on the same level, and if one
follows another, we treat the latter one as re-iteration and exclude it from our analysis. The
same is valid for Sell and Strong Sell recommendation. Hence, the subsequent recommenda-
tions after Rule 2711 that remain on one of the levels of Long, Hold, or Short as before Rule
2711 will be treated as re-iterations and, thus, ignored. At the same time, recommendations that
were resumed on a different level (e.g. changed from Long to Hold or Short) are considered as
recommendation changes and will affect our portfolios. As a result, the changes in brokers’
distribution ratings do not affect the results of our tests.
Our final database contains 172,525 recommendation changes for 6443 companies
listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ markets that were announced between
January 2002 and October 2014.
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The entire sample of analysts is divided into the following groups:
(1) Stars and Non-Stars;
(2) Institutional Investor (I/I), StarMine Top Earnings Estimators (STM-TEE) and Top Stock
Pickers (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ);
(3) Analysts ranked as number one (Top-Ranked): I/I-1, STM-TEE-1, STM-TSP-1 and,
WSJ-1.
When a particular analyst is rated as a star in two different industries, the analyst is included
only once in a particular group of stars. However, the same analyst can appear in more than one
ranking group. The similarities between the lists are discussed below and are reported in Table 5.
We compare these groups using two time frames:
1) The Year Before is the calendar year before a ranking is announced. For example, the WSJ
list of stars is announced in May 2003. Thus, the previous calendar year, from January
2002 through December 2002, is the evaluation year for the WSJ ranking. As a result, the
whole sample period for Year Before spans from January 2002 until December 2012. We
exclude the first month of January 2002 from our regression analysis because some
portfolios contained too few stocks and have extraordinary returns at the beginning of
that month. We evaluate analysts during the evaluation year using our portfolio approach
in order to compare the rankings in a uniform way independently of the methodology
used by a particular ranking.
2) The Year After is the one-year period that begins on the day that a particular ranking
is announced and ends when the next year ranking list is announced (or twelve-
month period for the last year 2013). For example, if the WSJ announcement is on
May 12, 2003, the Year After begins on that day and ends on May 17, 2004 when the
next ranking list was published. Although an entire sample period for Year After
spans from May 2003 until October 2014, we begin by comparing groups one month
after StarMine and I/I have published their lists, that is, from November 2003 (an
incomplete month, October, is excluded from the regression analysis). We end the
Year After period on May 2014 since that is the end of the last one-year period for
the 2013 list of WSJ stars.
Table 2 displays the total number of analysts in the sample on an election-year basis.
On average, approximately 13 % of analysts in our sample are listed as Bstars^ every
year. The table shows that for every one star analyst, there are approximately six non-
star analysts in our sample. Additionally, 32 % of analysts among the Non-Stars have
been chosen as stars in some other year but not in the year under consideration. Out of
8459 analysts overall, 27 % have been elected at least once as stars, with 7 percentage
points (pp) for I/I, 11 pp. – STM-TEE, 12 pp. – STM-TSP, 15 pp. – WSJ. For number-
one ranked stars the figures are: I/I-1, 2.0 pp., STM-TEE-1, 4.9 pp., STM-TSP-1,
5.4 pp. and, for WSJ-1, 4.4 pp.
The average overlap among the ranking lists in each sample year is presented in Table 3. It
shows the number of analysts listed by different rankings, the number of the same analysts in
each pair of rankings, and the portion of the same analysts in each ranking list. Panel A
presents these data for the entire groups of stars, while Panel B reports the results for the
number-one ranked stars. The table also presents the percentages of analysts who appear in
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another ranking. For example, the Institutional Investor ranking has, on average, 13 % of
analysts out of 191 unique names who were listed as BTop Stock Pickers^ by StarMine in the
same years. As can be observed, Top Stock Pickers and The Wall Street Journal exhibit the
highest similarity in their published lists, while Institutional Investor and The Wall Street
Journal have the lowest similarity. Such overlap is expected given the degree of similarities in
the evaluation methods used. It also shows how different the lists of Star analysts are, which
might explain the differences in the returns from their recommendations.
Table 4 shows the number of firms in the sample, which ranged from 3356 in 2010 to 3935
in 2006, and the percentage of firms covered by each group. On average per year, I/I, STM-
TEE, and STM-TSP star analysts covered 22–23 %, while WSJ covers 27 % of the firms in the
sample. Out of the total number of 6443 firms in our sample, I/I stars covered 36 % of the
firms, STM-TEE – 47 %, STM-TSP – 50 %, and WSJ – 58 %. This difference suggests that
these groups have different firm coverage, which could be explained by the fact that the WSJ
list has the highest turnover of names (they issue recommendations for different universes of
firms). Number-one ranked stars cover 10 % of the firms, except WSJ-1, which covers 8 % of
the firms.
As seen in Table 5, the group of Stars issues on average 20 % of all recommendations
in our sample. Both WSJ and I/I stars issue more recommendations than STM-TEE and
STM-TSP stars.
Table 4 Number of firms and percentage of firms in the sample covered by each group, calculated on an
election-year basis. Rankings by Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings
Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation
by -1 indicates a group of number-one ranked analysts. Each group of star analysts covers approximately 50 % of
firms in the sample. Thus, the coverage universe differs for the various groups of stars. The number of star
analysts in each industry varies in different rankings: for I/I it is 3 stars + Runners-up, for STM-TEE and STM-






Portion of firms covered by
Stars Entire groups of stars Number-one ranked stars
I/I STM-TEE STM-TSP WSJ I/I-1 STM-TEE-1 STM-TSP-1 WSJ-1
2003 3580 50 % 31 % 18 % 19 % 29 % 12 % 7 % 7 % 9 %
2004 3660 50 % 27 % 17 % 20 % 29 % 10 % 8 % 8 % 9 %
2005 3801 50 % 27 % 19 % 19 % 29 % 9 % 8 % 8 % 8 %
2006 3935 48 % 24 % 22 % 22 % 26 % 9 % 9 % 10 % 7 %
2007 3927 53 % 24 % 22 % 22 % 30 % 9 % 9 % 10 % 7 %
2008 3752 51 % 25 % 25 % 25 % 27 % 10 % 13 % 13 % 8 %
2009 3495 49 % 18 % 25 % 25 % 28 % 9 % 10 % 11 % 8 %
2010 3356 52 % 12 % 27 % 27 % 29 % 12 % 12 % 12 % 8 %
2011 3414 49 % 12 % 23 % 22 % 29 % 12 % 10 % 9 % 8 %
2012 3390 49 % 21 % 25 % 22 % 20 % 9 % 11 % 11 % 9 %
2013 3425 51 % 24 % 24 % 25 % 20 % 10 % 12 % 12 % 8 %
Average 3612 50 % 22 % 22 % 23 % 27 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 8 %
Overall 6443 71 % 36 % 47 % 50 % 58 % 20 % 29 % 32 % 30 %
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3 Results: risk-adjusted portfolio returns
3.1 Methods
To measure the profitability of the recommendations, we apply a well-established
methodology by constructing dynamic portfolios. We construct buy-and-hold BLong^,
BHold^, and BShort^ portfolios for each sub-group of analysts in the year subsequent to
the year in which the rankings were assigned (referred to as Year After) and for the year
during which the analysts were evaluated (referred to as Year Before) (Barber et al.
2006; Fang and Yasuda 2014). For each new Strong Buy or Buy recommendation, $1 is
invested at the end of the recommendation announcement day (or at the close of the
next trading day if the recommendation is issued after the closing of trading or on a
non-trading day) into the BLong^ portfolio. The stock is held in the portfolio for the
following calendar year if there are no recommendation revisions or recommendation
changes by the same analyst. If, during the following year, the analyst changes his or
her recommendation level from Strong Buy or Buy to Hold or Sell or Strong Sell, then
the stock is withdrawn from the BLong^ portfolio and placed in the BHold^ or BShort^
portfolio by the end of the trading day on which the new recommendation is issued (or
at the close of the next trading day if the recommendation is issued after the closing of
trading or on a non-trading day). If there is a recommendation revision, but the new
recommendation is on the same level (that is, Buy or Strong Buy), then the stock is not
kept in the same portfolio for an additional calendar year, but only until the next
recommendation change within one year from the initial recommendation. Thus, re-
Table 5 Number of recommendations and the percentage of recommendations on an election-year basis by each
ranking. Rankings by Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-
TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation by -1 indicates a
group of number-one ranked analysts. The number of star analysts in each industry varies in different rankings:





Stars Entire groups of stars Number-one ranked stars
I/I STM-TEE STM-TSP WSJ I/I-1 STM-TEE-1 STM-TSP-1 WSJ-1
2003 33,233 20 % 10 % 4 % 5 % 8 % 2.0 % 1.3 % 1.3 % 1.7 %
2004 32,600 20 % 9 % 4 % 5 % 8 % 1.9 % 1.5 % 1.6 % 1.9 %
2005 32,175 21 % 9 % 4 % 5 % 8 % 1.5 % 1.6 % 1.5 % 1.8 %
2006 32,005 20 % 8 % 6 % 6 % 7 % 1.7 % 2.1 % 2.2 % 1.4 %
2007 34,254 27 % 8 % 5 % 10 % 12 % 1.8 % 1.6 % 2.0 % 5.9 %
2008 36,551 25 % 7 % 6 % 7 % 11 % 1.8 % 2.7 % 2.9 % 6.0 %
2009 33,217 22 % 5 % 5 % 10 % 11 % 1.5 % 1.6 % 2.1 % 4.9 %
2010 31,686 17 % 2 % 6 % 6 % 7 % 2.1 % 2.3 % 2.3 % 1.3 %
2011 30,607 16 % 2 % 5 % 4 % 7 % 2.0 % 1.8 % 1.6 % 1.7 %
2012 29,181 18 % 6 % 6 % 5 % 4 % 1.6 % 2.0 % 2.3 % 1.7 %
2013 27,412 19 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 5 % 1.8 % 2.4 % 2.2 % 1.6 %
Average 32,084 20 % 6 % 5 % 6 % 8 % 1.8 % 1.9 % 2.0 % 2.7 %
Overall 291,731 19 % 6 % 6 % 7 % 9 % 1.7 % 2.1 % 2.3 % 2.7 %
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iterations of recommendations are not included in the portfolios. The same procedures
are applied to a BHold^ (includes only Hold recommendations) and BShort^ (includes
Sell and Strong Sell recommendations) portfolios. As a result of this strategy, the
calendar day t gross return on portfolio ρ includes from n = 1 to Nρt recommendations











where Xn, t-1 is the cumulative total gross return of stock in from the next trading day after a
recommendation was added to the portfolio to day t-1, which is the previous trading day before
t, that is:
X n;t−1 ¼ Rin;recdatnþ1Rin;recdatnþ2*:::*Rin;recdatnt−1 ð2Þ
Daily excess returns for each group’s BLong^, BHold^ and BShort^ portfolios are estimated
as an intercept (alpha) that is calculated according to the four-factor model proposed by
(Carhart 1997):
Rρτ−Rf τ ¼ αρ þ βρ Rmτ−Rf τð Þ þ sρSMBτ þ hρHMLτ þ mρUMDτ þ ερτ ; ð3Þ
where
& Rmτ is a daily market return
& Rfτ is the risk-free rate of return, SMBτ is a size factor, that is, the difference between the
value-weighted portfolio returns of small and large stocks
& HMLτ is a book-to-market factor, that is, the difference between the value-weighted
portfolio returns of high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks
& UMDτ is a momentum factor, that is, the difference in the returns of stocks with a positive
return momentum and those with a negative return momentum over months τ-12 and τ-2.
The alpha differentials (differences in alphas) are statistically tested using two approaches.
Alphas for groups in the same year, that is, Year After or Year Before, are compared using daily
differences in gross returns, which are regressed on four factors according to Equation (3). An
intercept from this regression returns the difference in alpha, and a t-test indicates whether this
difference is statistically significant. To compare excess returns between Year After with Year
Before, the seemingly unrelated estimation is accompanied by a test for significant differences
in the intercepts from various regressions (suest and test procedures in STATA).4
Even though all reported excess returns and alpha differentials are calculated on a daily
basis, we report figures in monthly values by multiplying daily values with 21 trading days.
4 We repeat our analysis using SUEST test for the statistical significance of alpha differentials for contempora-
neous comparison of the groups in the Year After or Year Before. Qualitatively, our results remain the same as
those reported in Tables 9 and 10.
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3.2 Results and discussion
Table 6 represents the average monthly excess returns (alphas) for BStars^ and BNon-Stars^
during the year after rankings have been published (Panel A), during the evaluation year (Panel
B) and as a comparison of the returns in the Year After with those of the Year Before (Panel C).
The first three rows in each panel of the table show the returns of the Long, Hold and Short
Table 6 Average monthly abnormal returns (alphas) for groups of Star and Non-Star analysts and differences in
abnormal returns. Rankings by Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings
Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Portfolios
are built according to recommendations: when a new recommendation is announced, $1 is invested in the
recommended stock by the end of the trading day (or on the next trading day if the recommendation is issued
after the close of trading or is announced on a non-trading day), and the stock is held for one year or until the
same analyst changes his or her recommendation or drops coverage, in which case the stock is withdrawn by the
end of that trading day. All figures are obtained as intercepts from the regressions of the daily returns time series
from two sample periods: the Year Before (February 2002 –December 2012) and the Year After (November 2003 –
May 2014) on four standard risk factors (Carhart’s four-factor model). The Long portfolio includes Buy and Strong
Buy recommendations; Hold portfolio includes all Hold recommendations, while the Short portfolio includes Sell,
and Strong Sell recommendations. Portfolios by Stars exhibit statistically significant decrease in performance from
the Year Before to the Year After. Long-Short portfolio by Stars performs insignificantly from that of the Non-Stars.
Only Buy and Strong Buy Recommendations by Star analysts persistently outperform Non-Stars
Portfolio Average monthly abnormal return (%) for the overall groups
Stars Non-Stars Difference
Stars – Non-Stars
Panel A. Year After (November 2003 – May 2014)

















































Panel C. Difference Year After – Year Before (SUEST TEST)
Long −0.29*** 0.02 –
Hold 0.02 0.01 –
Short 0.26** −0.05 –
Long-Short −0.55*** 0.07 –
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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portfolios, while the third row (Long-Short) presents the total return on all of the recommen-
dations for a particular group, which is the Long minus the Short portfolio returns.
As we can see in Table 6, Panel A, the Long-Short portfolio of Stars, with monthly alphas
of +0.53 %, performed insignificantly different from the Non-Stars, with monthly alphas of
+0.47 %, leading to a statistically insignificant difference of 0.06 percentage points in
abnormal returns for a Long-Short portfolio in the year after rankings were published. For
alpha differentials among all portfolios in the Year After, only Long portfolio of Stars is
statistically different from that of the Non-Stars. As can be expected, during the evaluation
year (Panel B in Table 6), Stars had higher recommendation returns, of +1.08 %, than Non-
Stars, with +0.40 %. When we analyze the differences in returns from the Year Before to the
Year After, as reported in Panel C, we conclude that the Stars do not continue to perform on the
same level, which is reflected as a significant difference in the returns on their Long, Short and
Long-Short portfolios, while the group of Non-Stars had an insignificant difference in the
returns on their Long, Short and Long-Short portfolios. Hence, we conclude that only Buy and
Strong Buy recommendations of the group of Stars persistently outperform those of their non-
star peers, although the Stars show a decrease in their performance in the Year After.
Table 7 shows the excess returns from recommendations issued by entire groups of stars:
BI/I^, BSTM-TEE^, BSTM-TSP^ and BWSJ^ in the Year After (Panel A) and Year Before
(Panel B) and the difference in returns between the Year After and Year Before (Panel C).
Long-Short portfolios from the groups of STM-TEE, STM-TSP andWSJ stars showpositive and
statistically significant alphas in both time periods, while I/I stars performed insignificantly different
from the market in the Year After. Excess returns of the Long portfolios for all groups in the Year
Before and Year After are statistically different from zero. Some Short portfolios are insignificantly
different from zero (that of I/I, STM-TSP in the Year After, and I/I, STM-TEE in the Year Before).
As can be seen in Panel C of Table 7, Long, Short and Long-Short portfolios from WSJ and
STM-TSP stars exhibit the greatest significant decrease in performance after election as a star, that
is −1.48 % forWSJ, and −1.37 % for STM-TSP for their Long-Short portfolios. This decrease can
be explained as the regression to the mean, which shows that it is very difficult to issue
recommendations consistently generating portfolios with very high abnormal returns. At the same
time, STM-TEE shows persistence because their Long-Short portfolio in the Year Before is
insignificantly different to the Year After (albeit the group of STM-TEE has significantly different
performance for their Short portfolio, as we can see in Panel C). For I/I stars, the drop is −0.26 %.
Table 8 shows the average monthly excess returns for the top-ranked analysts (number-one
ranked analysts) for the Year After election (Panel A) and the Year Before (Panel B) and the
difference between the Year After and the Year Before (Panel C). We find that the Hold
portfolios for all groups and all time periods perform insignificantly different from the market,
having alphas insignificantly different from zero.
In the Year After election, the groups of STM-TEE-1 and I/I-1 stars show positive and
statistically significant alphas for their Long-Short portfolios, while STM-TSP-1 and WSJ-1 stars
performed on the market level, which is explained by relatively low and insignificant alphas for
their Short portfolios. The highest return, and the only statistically significant one among the Short
portfolios in the Year After, was generated by the STM-TEE-1 group, with −0.70%. Excess returns
of Long portfolios for all groups in the Year After are positive and significantly different from zero.
Panel C shows that Long, Short and Long-Short portfolios from STM-TSP-1 and WSJ-1 stars
show a statistically significant decrease in performance from the Year Before to the Year After,
while I/I-1 and STM-TEE-1 exhibit persistence from the Year Before to the Year After. Hence,
comparing the returns in the Year After election with the Year Before election in Panel C of Table 8,
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the returns of STM-TSP-1 andWSJ-1 decrease, with a significant difference of −1.61 and −2.67%
between alphas in the Year After and Year Before, respectively.
Table 7 Average monthly abnormal returns (alphas) for each group of star analysts. Rankings by Institutional
Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^
(STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Portfolios are built according to recommendations: when a new
recommendation is announced, $1 is invested in the recommended stock by the end of the trading day (or on the
next trading day if the recommendation is issued after the closing of trading or is announced on a non-trading
day), and the stock is held for one year or until the same analyst changes his or her recommendation or drops
coverage, in which case the stock is withdrawn by the end of that trading day. All figures are obtained as
intercepts from the regressions of the daily returns time series on four standard risk factors (Carhart’s four-factor
model) and represented in monthly values from two sample periods: the Year Before (February 2002 – December
2012) and the Year After (November 2003 – May 2014). The Long portfolio includes Buy and Strong Buy
recommendations; Hold portfolio includes all Hold recommendations; the Short portfolio includes Sell and
Strong Sell recommendations. Groups of STM-TEE, STM-TSP and WSJ stars show positive and statistically
significant alphas for their Long-Short portfolios in both time periods, while recommendations from I/I stars
performed on the market level. Excess returns of Long portfolios for all groups in the Year Before and Year After
are significantly different from zero. Some Short portfolios are insignificantly different from zero (that of I/I,
STM-TSP in the Year After, and I/I in the Year Before). Long, Short and Long-Short portfolios from STM-TSP
and WSJ stars show significant decrease in the performance from the Year Before to the Year After. STM-TEE
shows persistency from the Year Before to the Year After (all differences are insignificant in Panel C). Hold
portfolios for all groups and all time periods perform on the market level (except of I/I in the Year After)
Portfolio Average monthly abnormal returns (%) for the entire groups of star analysts
I/I STM-TEE STM-TSP WSJ
Panel A. Year After (November 2003 – May 2014)

































































Panel C. Difference Year After – Year Before (SUEST TEST)
Long -0.07 -0.04 -0.52*** -0.75***
Hold 0.11 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03
Short 0.19 -0.40* 0.86*** 0.74***
Long-Short -0.26* 0.38 -1.37*** -1.48***
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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In Tables 9 and 10, we report the alpha differentials obtained by comparing the abnormal
returns between groups of stars in the Year Before and Year After. In both tables, we report
Table 8 Average monthly abnormal returns (alphas) for each group of number-one ranked analysts. Rankings by
Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock
Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation by -1 signifies a group of number-one
ranked analysts. Portfolios are built according to recommendations: when a new recommendation is announced,
$1 is invested in the recommended stock by the end of the trading day (or on the next trading day if the
recommendation is issued after the closing of trading or is announced on a non-trading day), and the stock is held
for one year or until the same analyst changes his or her recommendation or drops coverage, in which case the
stock is withdrawn by the end of that trading day. All figures are obtained as intercepts from the regressions of the
daily returns time series on four standard risk factors (Carhart’s four-factor model) and represented in monthly
values from two sample periods: the Year Before (February 2002 – December 2012) and the Year After
(November 2003 – May 2014). The Long portfolio includes Buy and Strong Buy recommendations; Hold
portfolio includes all Hold recommendations; the Short portfolio includes Sell, and Strong Sell recommendations.
Groups of STM-TEE-1 and I/I-1 stars show positive and statistically significant alphas for their Long-Short
portfolios in the Year After. Long-Short portfolios from STM-TSP-1 and WSJ-1 stars performed on the market
level which is explained by low and insignificant alphas for their Short portfolios. Excess returns of Long
portfolios for all groups in the Year After are positive and significantly different from zero. Long, Short and Long-
Short portfolios from STM-TSP-1 and WSJ-1 stars show significant decrease in the performance from the Year
Before to the Year After, while I/I-1 and STM-TEE-1 exhibit the persistently from the Year Before to the Year
After (all differences are insignificant in Panel C). Hold portfolios for all groups and all time periods perform on
the market level
Portfolio Average monthly abnormal returns (%) for number-one ranked star analysts
I/I-1 STM-TEE-1 STM-TSP-1 WSJ-1
Panel A. Year After (November 2003 – May 2014)

































































Panel C. Difference Year After – Year Before (SUEST TEST)
Long -0.07 0.00 -0.51*** -0.97***
Hold -0.03 -0.36** 0.14 -0.04
Short 0.08 -0.42 1.08** 1.70***
Long-Short -0.16 0.43 -1.61*** -2.67***
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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results for Long in Panel A, Short – Panel В, and Long-Short – Panel C. First, we discuss
whether each particular group of stars outperformed the Non-Stars. Then, we comment on the
differences in performance among all of the groups of star analysts.
Comparing the returns of the Long portfolios of all of the groups of stars with those of Non-
Stars in the Year Before (Panel A in Table 9), we find that the groups of I/I, STM-TSP and WSJ
stars and their number-one sub-groups significantly outperformedNon-Stars, while returns of the
STM-TEE and number-one ranked STM-TEE-1 had insignificant differences with Non-Stars.
Similar results were observed for the Short portfolios (Panel B in Table 9), where only STM-TSP
andWSJ aswell as their number-one sub-groups significantly outperformedNon-Stars.Whenwe
combine the performance of the Long and Short portfolios, that is the Long-Short portfolio (Panel
C), we can see that STM-TSP and WSJ stars outperformed the Non-Stars. Such a finding is
expected considering the similarity of the methods used by STM-TSP and WSJ rankings
(recommendation-based) and our performance measures.
In line with the fact that STM-TSP and WSJ are based on the investment value of
recommendations, and the methodologies of I/I and STM-TEE do not focus on the performance
of the recommendations, we find that the Long, Short, Long-Short portfolios from the groups of
STM-TSP and WSJ and their sub-groups of the number-one stars perform significantly better
than both groups of I/I and STM-TEE and their number-one stars I/I-1 and STM-TEE-1 (Panel
A, B and C in Table 9). Considering the returns for the Long and Short portfolios in the Year
Before, the Long-Short portfolios represent similar patterns: stars ranked by the methodologies
that take into account investment value of recommendations (STM-TSP and WSJ)
outperformed those that do not use the recommendations in their election methods (I/I and
STM-TEE), with those differences being statistically significant. This result is expected given
the evaluation methodologies applied to rank stars, since both STM-TSP andWSJ rankings are
objectively measuring the investment value of the recommendations, whereas STM-TEE
focuses on the accuracy and timing of earnings forecasts, and the I/I ranking uses investment
value as one of several attributes in its subjective methodology (survey) to select stars.
Comparing the returns of the Long portfolios in the Year After of all of the groups of stars
with those of Non-Stars (first column in Panel A of Table 10), we find that only returns of I/I-1,
STM-TSP and STM-TSP-1 stars significantly outperformed those of the group of Non-Stars at
the 10 % significance level, while entire groups of I/I, STM-TEE, and WSJ as well as number-
one ranked stars from STM-TEE-1 and WSJ-1 did not significantly differ from Non-Stars.
Analyzing Panel B of Table 10 for the Short portfolios in the Year After, we find that the
differences between the excess returns of all of the groups of stars and those of Non-Stars were
insignificant, except for I/I who underperformed, and STM-TEE who outperformed, the Non-
Stars. This high performance of the Short portfolio for the STM-TEE and low performance for
I/I was reflected in how the returns of these groups differ from the others. Hence, the
differences in returns among most of the Short portfolios in the Year After are insignificant,
except for I/I being significantly lower than some other groups of stars, and STM-TEE being
significantly better than STM-TSP and their sub-group of STM-TSP-1. The results for the
Long and Short portfolios explain why Long-Short portfolios of I/I underperformed Non-Stars
and some of the groups of stars, while the STM-TEE and their number-one analysts performed
significantly better than the Non-Stars and STM-TSP. We interpret this result to reflect the
importance of making accurate earnings forecasts5 in order to predict a future price decrease,
5 As has been mentioned previously, earnings forecasts are important for valuation of stocks and thus for
predicting future stock price (Ohlson 1995; Loh and Mian 2006).
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which facilitated the outperformance of the Short portfolios of the STM-TEE stars in order to
outperform Non-Stars as well as STM-TSP stars.
By analyzing the persistence in the performance for the Long portfolios from the Year
Before to the Year After, we conclude that the groups of I/I-1, STM-TSP and STM-TSP-1
performed significantly better than Non-Stars in both the Year After and Year Before (Panel A
in Tables 9 and 10), while the group of STM-TEE with their sub-group of number-one ranked
Table 9 Alpha differentials in the Year Before calculated as the difference in the excess return from the vertical
group minus the excess return for a horizontal group of stars. Rankings by Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson
Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall
Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation by -1 signifies a group of number-one ranked analysts. Excess returns were
obtained from regressions for time series from a sample period of the Year Before (February 2002 – December
2012). Long portfolios (Panel A) include Strong Buy and Buy recommendations; Short portfolios (Panel B)
include Sell and Strong Sell recommendations. Panel C shows the results for the Long-Short portfolios. Hold
portfolios are not compared
Alpha differentials (%) in the Year Before (February 2002 – December 2012) for the groups of
analysts
Non-Stars I/I STM-TEE STM-TSP WSJ I/I-1 STM-TEE-1 STM-TSP-1
Panel A. Long portfolios: Strong Buy, Buy recommendations
I/I 0.23**
STM-TEE 0.19 -0.03
STM-TSP 0.73*** 0.51*** 0.54***
WSJ 0.81*** 0.58*** 0.62*** 0.08
I/I-1 0.35** 0.12 0.15 -0.39*** -0.46***
STM-TEE-1 0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.59*** -0.67*** -0.20
STM-TSP-1 0.77*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.03 0.04 0.42** 0.62***
WSJ-1 1.19*** 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.84*** 1.04*** 0.42**
Panel B. Short portfolios: Sell, Strong Sell recommendations
I/I 0.23
STM-TEE 0.00 -0.22
STM-TSP -0.78*** -1.00*** -0.78***
WSJ -0.90*** -1.13*** -0.90*** -0.12
I/I-1 -0.12 -0.34* -0.12 0.66** 0.78***
STM-TEE-1 -0.04 -0.26 -0.04 0.74** 0.86** 0.08
STM-TSP-1 -0.62** -0.84*** -0.62* 0.16 0.28 -0.50 -0.58
WSJ-1 -1.66*** -1.88*** -1.66*** -0.88** -0.76** -1.54*** -1.62*** -1.04**
Panel C. Long-Short portfolios
I/I 0.00
STM-TEE 0.19 0.19
STM-TSP 1.51*** 1.51*** 1.32***
WSJ 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.52*** 0.20
I/I-1 0.47 0.46** 0.27 -1.05*** -1.25***
STM-TEE-1 0.18 0.18 -0.01 -1.33*** -1.53*** -0.28
STM-TSP-1 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.19*** -0.13 -0.33 0.92** 1.20***
WSJ-1 2.85*** 2.84*** 2.65*** 1.33*** 1.13*** 2.38*** 2.66*** 1.46***
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1
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STM-TEE-1 stars had insignificantly different returns from Non-Stars before and after rank-
ings were announced. Additionally, it is important to mention that the difference in the returns
of the Long portfolios in the Year Before (Panel A in Table 9) among the entire groups of star
analysts shows that, while STM-TSP andWSJ stars and their sub-groups of number-one STM-
TSP-1 and WSJ-1 stars significantly outperformed I/I, STM-TEE and their number-one sub-
groups, the differences in returns among all of the groups in the Year After are insignificant
Table 10 Alpha differentials in the Year After calculated as the difference in the excess return from the vertical
group minus the excess return for a horizontal group of stars. Rankings by Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson
Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall
Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation by -1 signifies a group of number-one ranked analysts. Excess returns were
obtained from regressions for time series from a sample period of the Year After (November 2003 –May 2014).
Long portfolios (Panel A) include Strong Buy and Buy recommendations; Short portfolios (Panel B) include Sell
and Strong Sell recommendations. Panel C shows the results for the Long-Short portfolios. Hold portfolios are
not compared
Alpha differentials (%) in the Year After (November 2003 – May 2014) for the groups of
analysts
Non-Stars I/I STM-TEE STM-TSP WSJ I/I-1 STM-TEE-1 STM-TSP-1
Panel A. Long portfolios: Strong Buy, Buy recommendations
I/I 0.15
STM-TEE 0.15 0.00
STM-TSP 0.21* 0.06 0.06
WSJ 0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15
I/I-1 0.26* 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.21
STM-TEE-1 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.13
STM-TSP-1 0.24* 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.19 -0.03 0.10
WSJ-1 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.15 -0.06 0.07 -0.03
Panel B. Short portfolios: Sell, Strong Sell recommendations
I/I 0.47***
STM-TEE -0.35** -0.82***
STM-TSP 0.13 -0.34 0.48**
WSJ -0.11 -0.58*** 0.24 -0.24
I/I-1 0.02 -0.45** 0.37 -0.11 0.13
STM-TEE-1 -0.41 -0.88*** -0.05 -0.53* -0.29 -0.43
STM-TSP-1 0.52 0.05 0.87** 0.39 0.63 0.50 0.93**
WSJ-1 0.09 -0.38 0.44 -0.04 0.20 0.07 0.49 -0.43
Panel C. Long-Short portfolios
I/I -0.32**
STM-TEE 0.50*** 0.82***
STM-TSP 0.08 0.40* -0.42*
WSJ 0.16 0.49** -0.34 0.09
I/I-1 0.24 0.57*** -0.26 0.17 0.08
STM-TEE-1 0.54* 0.86*** 0.04 0.47 0.38 0.30
STM-TSP-1 -0.28 0.04 -0.78* -0.36 -0.44 -0.53 -0.82*
WSJ-1 0.12 0.44 -0.38 0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.42 0.40
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1
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(Panel A in Table 10). This result confirms the assumption that, in most cases, there is the
regression to the mean, which explains why in the Year Before the differences in returns were
mostly statistically significant while in the Year After all of the groups of stars perform
insignificantly different from each other.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of frequency ofmonths when a particular group appears to be the
best group comparedwith other groups within the same comparison pool. For example, using raw
monthly returns (calculated as geometrically-aggregated daily returns within a given month),
Stars are compared withNon-Stars: the number of months when Stars outperformedNon-Stars is
divided by the total number of months in the sample period. These results are in line with the
abnormal returns analyzed above. We observe that Long portfolio of Stars outperformed Non-
Stars for 59 % of the months in our sample period. However, the Short portfolio of Stars
outperformed that of the Non-Stars during only 46 % of the months. In the pool with the entire
groups of stars for both Long and Short portfolios, STM-TEE, STM-TSP and WSJ stars show
very similar frequencies of months when a given group outperformed the others, and only I/I stars
had a substantially lower number of months than the other three groups. For top-ranked analysts,
the Long and Short portfolios of all sub-groups of stars exhibit similar patterns with the WSJ-1
analysts having the highest frequency for both portfolios.
Using the returns obtained by comparing the portfolio returns in the years after election and
analyzing the frequency of months in which particular groups outperformed the others, we
conclude as follows: Firstly, we document that only the Long portfolio of the group of Stars
which has all unique names of ranked analysts from I/I, WSJ and StarMine rankings performs
better than that of the Non-Stars. Note, though, that Short and Long-Short (Long minus Short)
portfolios from both groups have statistically insignificant differences in returns. Our finding
that the group of Stars outperforms Non-Stars only for Buy and Strong Buy but not for Sell
and Strong Sell recommendations is consistent with a hypothesis that reputation helps in
mitigating conflicts of interest. According to Fang and Yasuda (2009), reputation effects from
star rankings can improve the quality of analyst research and this improvement might happen
more for favorable ratings like Buy and Strong Buy, which are more likely to be conflicted
(Michaely and Womack 1999; Barber et al. 2006).
Considering that, in the year before election, Stars had significantly higher returns for their
Long-Short portfolios and the differences between Long and Short portfolios were greater than
in the year after, we conclude that, on average, Stars are not able to repeat the observed high
excess returns after they were selected as Stars. However, this result does not imply that all
rankings’ methodologies have the same low predictive power of the future returns.
Secondly, we investigated the differences among subjective (I/I) and objective (StarMine and
WSJ) rankings and found that the returns of the recommendations from analysts ranked by the
subjective ranking from the Institutional Investor had relatively low returns in the Year Before as
well as in the Year After election. Indeed, most of the portfolios from I/I stars underperformed the
other groups of stars from objective rankings and even underperformed the non-star peers. Though
this conclusion might be essential for the investors who are concerned about the investment value
of recommendations, it is important to remember that the Institutional Investor ranking does not
consider the recommendations as the primary evaluation criteria for selecting analysts. According
to a list of attributes mentioned by the Institutional Investor magazine and to Table 1 in Bagnoli
et al. (2008), stock selection is not the number one criteria institutions are looking for when
ranking analysts. In fact, stock selection is typically not even among the top five attributes
that institutional investors are looking for. Thus, our findings do not contradict the intentions of
the I/I ranking (that is, to evaluate subjectively the services provided by sell-side analysts).
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An additional point to consider concerns conflicts of interest, which analysts face if they







































































Number-one ranked stars Long Short
Fig. 1 Frequency of months when a particular group of analysts outperformed the other groups. Rankings by
Institutional Investor (I/I), Thomson Reuters’ StarMine BTop Earnings Estimators^ (STM-TEE) and BTop Stock
Pickers^ (STM-TSP), and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Indexation by -1 signifies a group of number-one
ranked analysts. Daily returns were geometrically aggregated to monthly values. Time period is from November
2003 until May 2014. Long portfolios contain Strong Buy and Buy recommendations; Short portfolios contain
Sell and Strong Sell recommendations. Hold portfolios are not compared
J Financ Serv Res
of the recommendations from stars selected by I/I ranking. Thus, analysts may issue over-
optimistic recommendations on a stock that a particular buy-side client is overweighting.
While this might lead to the poor performance of the analyst’s stock picks, it might help to buy
some votes in the coming I/I poll. This reasoning goes in line with the previous findings by
Mola and Guidolin (2009), who reported that I/I star analysts are more prone to issue too-
optimistic ratings for the stocks that affiliated mutual funds hold.
Among the objective rankings, we find significant differences in their predictive power,
which we discuss as the persistence of the performance from the Year Before to the Year After
election. We document a significant decrease in performance from the Year Before to the Year
After for the analysts who were ranked according to the investment value of the recommen-
dations (STM-TSP and WSJ). This result might be explained by the low predictive power of
such recommendation-based election methods which lead to the regression to the mean,
whereby the previous year’s best performers should exhibit results that are closer to the
average in subsequent years. However, we observed significantly positive returns for the Long
portfolios of the STM-TSP and STM-TSP-1 stars, which outperformed Non-Stars in the year
after election, even though there is a decline in performance compared with the evaluation
year. Overall, our results confirm the previous findings that reported low predictive power for
the methods which focus solely on the past performance of the recommendations (Emery and
Li 2009).
In contrast to the results for objective recommendation-based rankings, for STM-TEE
ranking that is based on the accuracy and timing of earnings forecasts, the returns for Long-
Short portfolios in the Year After differ insignificantly from those of the Year Before. More
important is that this group outperforms Non-Stars and some other groups of stars (I/I and
STM-TPS) in the year after election. We document that this outperformance is explained by
the high excess returns for the Short portfolio of STM-TEE, while their Long portfolio was
insignificantly different from the Non-Stars as well as those of the other groups of stars. This
conclusion emphasizes the importance of accurate earnings forecasts being used in the
valuation models in order to predict future stock prices, especially the decrease in prices,
which lead to the outperformance among Short portfolios.
Overall, we conclude that the stock-picking skill is difficult to capture by focusing
only on the performance of the recommendations over a one-year horizon. However,
methodologies which consider other fundamental skills, such as earnings forecasts that
are necessary for successful stock picks, gave much higher predictive power for the
performance of future recommendations, even though the previous year returns by our
evaluation methodology for those earnings-based stars were not as high as for the
recommendation-based rankings.
3.3 Robustness test
In this paper we employ a method used by other researchers (Barber et al. 2007; Fang and
Yasuda 2014) holding the stocks in the portfolio for one year or until the next recommendation
change from the same analyst, whichever happens earlier. Our baseline analysis considers all
recommendation changes issued by all analysts listed in different rankings. In this section we
discuss the results from imposing additional filters on the samples of recommendations and
analysts. Also, we discuss alternative holding periods and construction of the Short portfolios.
First, we exclude the recommendation changes which were issued on the same days as
earnings announcement days in order to avoid contamination in measuring analyst stock-
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picking skill. While the previous study by Li et al. (2015) documents that the
contemporaneous-with-news recommendation changes have higher market impact than the
earnings announcements themselves since such recommendations help investors interpret the
news, some of such recommendations might simply be piggybacking on the news without
providing more value to investors. Excluding the recommendations that were issued on the
same days as the earnings announcement dates obtained from the Compustat database
(accounted for 3.4 % of recommendations), we find that our main conclusions remain the
same, though the alphas were insignificantly decreased. Excluding the recommendations that
were issued within a three-day window around earnings announcements (17.3 % of recom-
mendations), we found slight changes in conclusions from our baseline analysis. Specifically,
the Long portfolios of I/I in the Year After performed significantly better than the Non-Stars;
also, the differences in returns for Long-Short portfolios among STM-TEE and STM-TSP
became insignificant. However, the results of the comparison for the Long-Short portfolios of
each group of stars with the Non-Stars remain unaffected: STM-TEE outperformed, while I/I
underperformed the group of Non-Stars.
Second, we repeat our calculations using two filters on our sample of analysts: (i) non-
overlapping sample of stars; and (ii) in each industry, limit the number of stars to one, two, and
three only (applies to I/I and WSJ, while StarMine lists remain unchanged). While the non-
overlapping samples exclude those analysts who are performing well according to some or
even all evaluation methods (subjective or objective), such a limitation might help to distil the
differences between rankings’ performance. By considering only three stars in each industry in
I/I and WSJ lists, we try to reduce the differences in the number of analysts in each group of
stars and eliminate the influence of bottom-ranked analysts (runners-up) on our conclusions. In
both cases, we focused on the differences among groups of stars and found that, in the case of
focusing on only three stars per industry, our main conclusions remain the same. After
examining the results for non-overlapping samples, we found that the highest change was
for the groups of I/I and STM-TEE stars whose Long-Short portfolio returns were lower as
compared to our baseline analysis. The decrease of the returns for some portfolios for non-
overlapping groups of stars led to an insignificant difference in performance between groups of
STM-TEE and I/I with STM-TSP stars. Since some star analysts appear in several rankings in
a given year and the results are lower with non-overlapping samples of STM-TEE and I/I, we
interpret this fact as an indication that the best analysts are selected as stars in several rankings
at the same time.
Third, we use some alternative portfolio constructs: (i) we take the immediate year before
rankings were announced instead of the previous calendar year; and (ii) we include Hold
recommendations into Short portfolios, thus having only two portfolios to consider, namely
Long and Short.
We take an immediate year before the rankings’ announcement to use data that are more
current and relevant. The fact that I/I and StarMine rankings are announced around October
each year, and WSJ publishes its list of stars in May, potentially creates a bias, as information
used for analysis is relatively stale for I/I and StarMine compared to WSJ. After we repeat our
calculations for a new time-frame of the Year Before, we find that the excess returns for I/I
changed insignificantly, while the returns for WSJ and STM-TSP decreased (especially for
STM-TSP, since STM-TSP is published in October, the overlap of the immediate year before
ranking is announced with the previous calendar year is lower than for WSJ, which is
published in May). This decrease in the performance for recommendation-based rankings
led to insignificant differences between the returns for Long-Short portfolios of STM-TSP and
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WSJ with those of the STM-TEE in the Year Before. Also, the difference among Long-Short
portfolios for STM-TSP and I/I stars became insignificant. These results are in line with our
main findings as they show that high excess returns were documented only during the same
year as the evaluation year, while they regressed to the mean in subsequent time periods.
We also tested alternative portfolio constructs by including Hold recommendations into the
Short portfolio as in Barber et al. (2007) and in Fang and Yasuda (2014). Taking into account
that analysts are reluctant to issue sell recommendations (Barber et al. 2007), investors might
treat Hold ratings as a signal to sell, especially when this Hold is a downgrade from Buy or
Strong Buy. While this might lead to a negative price reaction on some Hold recommenda-
tions, the upgrades from Sell/Strong Sell to Hold are expected to generate near market returns
(Barber et al. 2010). We repeated our calculations and found that the alpha levels for Short
portfolios that contain Hold/Sell/Strong Sell recommendations on a one-year horizon
were close to zero for almost all portfolios.6 That result is expected considering that
such Short portfolios had about 90 % weight in Hold recommendations, and according
to our results for BLong, Hold, Short^ portfolio calculations, Hold portfolios have
alphas insignificant from zero for all groups of analysts (except for the Hold portfolio
of I/I stars, see Panel A in Table 7).
Additionally, we reconstructed all portfolios using shorter holding periods, such as 30 days
as in (Fang and Yasuda 2014) and realized that the Short portfolios (Sell/Strong Sell recom-
mendations) for some groups of stars had a very low number of stocks. Thus, Short portfolios
of STM-TSP had only 9.1 stocks on average, STM-TEE had 7.5 stocks, and portfolios for the
number-one ranked StarMine analysts had on average fewer than 5 stocks. We also tested other
time periods within a horizon of one year (namely, 45, 60, 90, 180 days) and found that up to
180 days, the Short portfolios from the number-one ranked stars had a relatively low number
of stocks (less than 10). Hence, those portfolios were highly undiversified and their excess
returns were unreliable. Consequently, we decided to stick to a one-year horizon for consid-
ering the recommendations to be valid if they are unchanged, and we found that for short
portfolios the number-one stars had on average 20 stocks and for the entire groups of stars the
average number was more than 50 stocks during the investigated time period.
Finally, we tested combinations of different restrictions, such as a non-overlapping sample
of only three stars in each industry, and excluding the recommendations on earnings an-
nouncement days. We find that all possible filters affect the alpha levels, but do not influence
our main conclusions on the differences between groups of Stars and Non-Stars, while the
differences among Long-Short portfolios for the groups of stars become statistically insignif-
icant. All the results of the robustness tests remain unpublished and are available upon request
from the authors.
4 Conclusion
The goal of this study was to determine whether star rankings can be employed as an indicator
of the future profitability of analysts’ recommendations. By using a unique database for the
period from 2003 to 2014, we find that sell-side analysts indeed issue profitable
6 Only the returns of the Short and Long-Short portfolios were affected in this robustness test, while the results
for the Long portfolios remained unchanged.
J Financ Serv Res
recommendations. This conclusion is supported by the previous research of Mikhail et al.
(2004), who find that sell-side analysts are persistent in issuing profitable recommendations.
Our results challenge the finding by Emery and Li (2009) that star rankings are largely
Bpopularity contests^. In our study, we found that only Buy and Strong Buy recommendations
from the entire group of Star analysts outperform those of the Non-Stars in the year after
election, while Sell and Strong Sell recommendations performed as those of the Non-Stars.
While Stars had significantly higher returns for their portfolios during the evaluation year, the
group of Stars was not able to repeat the excess returns at the same level after rankings were
announced.
After investigating the differences among subjective (I/I) and objective (StarMine andWSJ)
rankings, we found that the returns of the recommendations from analysts ranked by the
subjective ranking from I/I underperformed most of the other groups of stars as well as the
group of Non-Stars. However, this finding does not contradict the intentions of the I/I ranking,
whose methodology does not focus on the investment value of recommendations. Among
objective rankings, we found that the most persistent results were observed for the group of
STM-TEE analysts, who were selected based on the accuracy and timing of the earnings
forecasts. Their recommendations outperformed the groups of stars from STM-TSP and I/I as
well as Non-Stars in the year after election. We document that the recommendation-based
STM-TSP and WSJ rankings show a significant decrease in performance from the evaluation
year to the year after rankings were published, thus confirming the previous findings that
reported a low predictive power for the methods which focus solely on the past performance of
the recommendations (Emery and Li 2009).
In summary, the choice of which analysts to work with is of great importance for the long-
term growth of an investor’s portfolio. Our results show that the stock-picking skill is difficult
to capture by focusing only on the performance of the recommendations over a one-year
horizon. In our study, we provided empirical evidence regarding which star rankings of sell-
side analysts a potential investor should have relied on, namely, the StarMine’s BTop Earnings
Estimators^. We find it comforting that estimation of future earnings is important for
predicting portfolio returns, since valuation models used for valuing stocks are built on a
company’s future earnings. In conclusion, our results show that stock-picking ability reflects a
set of skills that can be captured using more fundamental evaluation methods such as those that
consider earnings forecasts.
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